Paul Boghossian – The Boundaries of Inference

October 17, 2018 Leave a comment

The Department of Philosophy at Concordia University will host Paul Boghossian this Friday, October 26th as part of the Concordia Philosophy Speaker Series.

Speaker: Paul Boghossian is Silver Professor of Philosophy at NYU’s Philosophy Department, and Distinguished Research Professor at the University of Birmingham in the UK. He is the director of the New York Institute of Philosophy and the Director of NYU’s Global Institute for Advanced Study.

 Time:  Friday, October 26, 3:00-5:00 p.m.

Location:  Concordia Philosophy Department, 2145 Mackay St., Room S-201 (upstairs).

 Title: The Boundaries of Inference

Abstract:  In this talk, Dr. Boghossian will look at how we should decide the question of what inference is and discuss some objections to his ‘intellectualist’ and ‘agential’ conception of inference.


This is a free public lecture. All are welcome.



Vers Deleuze. Nature, pensée, politique +Le mensonge dans le discours public.

October 14, 2018 Leave a comment

Vous êtes cordialement invités à un double régal :

le jeudi 25 Octobre 2018 au local AM-205, Bibliothèque centrale, UQAM,
400 rue Sainte-Catherine est :

• D’abord, à partir de 16h00lancement avec bulles et fromages de :  Yves Couture, Lawrence Olivier (dirs), Vers Deleuze. Nature, pensée, politique (collection « Mercure du Nord », PUL).

• Ensuite, à partir de 17h30, la conférence – débat : Le mensonge dans le discours public.

Conférencier : Michel Lincourt, chercheur senior, Chaire Unesco-Uqam.

Avocat du diable : Marc Lamontagne, Cegep Édouard-Montpetit.

Alexis Richard – Les émotions chez Démosthène. Le serment sur les morts dans le Discours sur la Couronne.

October 9, 2018 Leave a comment

Cycle conjoint des conférences – débats AUTOMNE 2018

 Chaire UNESCO-UQAM et Chaire ACME-Laval

Jeudi 11 Octobre

17h30-19h30 – Salle AM-205 Bibliothèque centrale

Pavillon Hubert-Aquin, UQAM, 400, rue Sainte-Catherine Est



« Quand l’histoire sort de ses gonds » (Michelet)


Le rôle politique des émotions et leurs effets d’ébranlement dans la culture démocratique nous intéresseront tout au long du cycle conjoint de cette année académique 2018-19. Nous scruterons les moments décisifs quand les autorités en place prennent peur et qu’elles transforment cet effroi en le projetant vers leurs ennemis, intérieurs ou extérieurs. Ce qui implique tout  autant le passage par  les représentations que  leur  transcription en termes dactions politiques,  de revendications populaires,  de luttes de groupes.

On se demandera comment ces phénomènes qui traversent l’Histoire et qui accompagnent les révolutions, de l’Antiquité à la Modernité, relèvent également des  combats dopinion, des rivalités de l’imaginaire, et aussi de leurs déclinaisons  concrètes dans  des  émotions et autres passions, qu’elles soient canalisées par  des rites, du décorum, des discours, des manifestations, des  massacres, des exécutions ou des fêtes collectives de l’unité rêvée.


Deuxième Séance

Jeudi 11 Octobre

Alexis RICHARD (Institut Grammata), Les émotions chez Démosthène. Le serment sur les morts dans le  Discours sur la Couronne.

Avocat du diable : Vanessa MOLINA (Institut Grammata).

McGill Philosophy Workshop Series

October 3, 2018 Leave a comment

When: October 11th at 11:00am

Where: McGill University, Leacock Building, room 927, 855 Sherbrooke Street West (metro McGill or Peel)


11:00-12:15  Samantha Berthelette (Florida State University) “Self-Deception without the Desire to Believe”

Abstract: Alfred Mele suggests that garden-variety self-deception occurs when an agent acquires a false belief by treating evidence in a motivationally biased way. But Dana Nelkin criticizes Mele’s account for being overly broad. There are some cases, she argues, that we would intuitively judge to not be instances of self-deception even though they satisfy all of Mele’s conditions. To remedy this problem, she offers her own account of self-deception: the Desire to Believe account. She argues that in every case of self-deception, the agent must have a desire to believe that p. In my paper, I identify a major problem for Nelkin’s view. I argue that her account sorts some clear cases of self-deception as not self-deception. Although Nelkin’s objection to Mele is that his account is too broad, Nelkin’s own account turns out to be too narrow. I then defend Mele’s account against Nelkin’s objection. Although Nelkin herself might have clear intuitions about her counterexamples, I offer empirical evidence that suggests most people do not. Because her counterexamples fail to incite the sort of intuitions she expects, I argue that she has not given us sufficient reason to reject Mele’s account.

12:15-12:45  A light lunch will be served

12:45-2:00  Brett Castellanos (Florida State University) “Responsibility and Authenticity”

Abstract: Several philosophers have offered deep-self views of responsibility. Typically, such a view will prioritize some aspect of an agent’s psychology such as his or her desires as particularly important for responsibility. So, when the agent’s desires are properly involved in an action, the agent is responsible for that action (unless there is some other excusing or exempting factor). However, these views face two objections that I’ll address here: cases involving manipulation and cases involving the shallow self. Although these objections problematic in quite different ways—manipulation cases make changes to the content of the deep self while the latter objection focuses on psychological elements outside the agent’s deep self—I’ll argue that both problems point toward single solution: authenticity. Instead of focusing on a particular type of psychological state, as constituting the deep self, a successful theory of responsibility will focus on finding those states that are authentic.

Dana Nelkin – Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility

September 30, 2018 Leave a comment
Pour sa 36e conférence, Fillosophie en collaboration avec le Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativité (GRIN) a le plaisir d’accueillir la philosophe Dana Nelkin (University of California, San Diego) qui présentera une conférence intitulée “Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility”.
Celle-ci aura lieu le vendredi 12 octobre de 13h à 15h, au local W-5215 du département de philosophie de l’UQAM (455 René Lévesque Est) et sera donnée en anglais.
Résumé : We naturally speak about moral obligations (e.g., “you ought to have kept your promise”) and we speak about epistemic ones and even sometimes what look like aesthetic ones, too (e.g., “you ought to have known that the polls were within the margin of error” and “you should have done better with that painting”).  Similarly, we blame and praise people for epistemic and aesthetic transgressions and achievements, as well as moral ones.  For these reasons, it is natural to conclude that our moral, aesthetic and epistemic practices should be treated in highly parallel ways, at least when it comes to the realm of holding responsible, praiseworthy, and blameworthy.  At the same time, there are clear asymmetries between the moral and epistemic case, and also between the moral and the aesthetic, which might seem to doom any hope for a genuinely parallel treatment.  For example, as many have pointed out, unlike actions or omissions, which are central objects of moral obligations, praise and blame, belief does not seem to be the kind of thing one has control over.  When it comes to the aesthetic case, many have doubted that we have obligations in the way that we do in the other cases.  Further, moral blame has seemed to many to be governed by a number of interpersonal norms that don’t seem to have parallels in either the pure epistemic or pure aesthetic case.  Despite these challenges, I argue that the prospects are promising for a unifying framework that applies in all three cases while at the same time leaving room for divergence on some important dimensions.  In particular, in this paper, I pursue the idea that one’s degree of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness depends on the quality of one’s opportunity in a given case.
Dana Nelkin is a professor of philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. Her main interests in philosophy are free will and moral responsibility, and she also explores their connections to psychology, ethical theory, epistemology, and the law. She has recently taken on the position of North American Representative of the Society for Applied Philosophy and is now an Affiliate Professor of Law at the University of San Diego. She is the author of several books and papers. Among them:
The Ethics and Law of Omissions, co-edited with Samuel C. Rickless in Oxford University Press 2017, “Intuitive Probabilities and the Limits of Moral Imagination” (Arseny Ryazanov, Jonathan Knutzen, Samuel C. Rickless, Nicholas Christenfeld, Dana Kay Nelkin) Cognitive Science, “Moral Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions: A New Tracing Account” in The Ethics and Law of Omissions, Dana Kay Nelkin and Samuel C. Rickless (eds.) (Oxford University Press).
La conférence est gratuite et ouverte à tout le monde. Des collations seront servies.
Nous espérons vous y voir en grand nombre!
L’équipe de Fillosophie

Sally Haslanger – Consciousness Raising and the Epistemology of (In)Justice

September 30, 2018 Leave a comment

Pour sa 37e conférence, Fillosophie a le très grand plaisir d’accueillir Sally Haslanger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Cette conférence aura lieu le vendredi 26 octobre à 14h au pavillon Coeur des sciences de l’UQAM. En raison d’une nombre limité de places, les portes ouvriront à 13h30.

Lieu/Location : la Chaufferie (CO-R700) du pavillon Cœur des sciences, 175, avenue du Président-Kennedy Montréal (Québec) H2X3P2

Attention : Cette salle se situe dans la cour intérieure du Complexe des sciences Pierre-Dansereau. This room is located in the inner courtyard of the Pierre-Dansereau Sciences Complexe.

Titre/Title : “Consciousness Raising and the Epistemology of (In)Justice”

Résumé/Abstract : In the context of ideal theory, the Rawlsian original position has been a standard method for attempting to determine what justice is.  The epistemology of justice in the context of non-ideal theory, especially the epistemology of consciousness raising, has been mostly neglected in contemporary philosophy.  This paper makes a start on an epistemology of justice by considering how an epistemology of justice differs from a moral epistemology for individual action and explores the role of counter-publics and social movements in ideology critique.

Bio : Sally Haslanger is Ford Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at MIT, and an affiliate in the MIT Women’s and Gender Studies Program.  She is a specialist of analytic metaphysics and epistemology, ancient philosophy (especially Aristotle), social and political philosophy, feminist theory, and critical race theory. For over a decade she co-edited the Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy. She also convened the Workshop on Gender and Philosophy, and the Women in Philosophy Task Force, and served as Director of the Women’s and Gender Studies Program at MIT from 2009 to 2013. She received many awards, notably the Guggenheim Fellowship, this year. She is the author of many books and articles. This year, her paper “What is a Social Practice?” was published in the Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements. In 2017, among others, “The Sex/Gender Distinction and the Social Construction of Reality”  In the Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy, “Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements” in Res Philosophica, “Objectivity, Epistemic Objectification, and Oppression”, In the Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice. 

Comme à l’habitude, l’événement est gratuit, ouvert et accessible à tout le monde. Une collation sera servie. La conférence se déroulera en anglais.

As usual, the event is free, open and accessible to all. There will be a complementary light buffet. The conference will take place in English. Welcome to everyone !

Kathryn Weaver – Promoting a culture of ethical sensitivity for nursing and related health and human service disciplines

September 26, 2018 Leave a comment

[Un message en français suivra.]

Dear colleagues

We are thrilled to share with you the annual program of the Montreal Health Ethics Seminar Series (2018-2019) and invite you to our first keynote presentation by Kathryn Weaver on October 18th, at 12PM.

The Montreal Health Ethics Seminar Series is a bilingual monthly seminar/webinar series aimed at bringing people together to think about and discuss issues in health ethics. Our aim is to promote health ethics through seminars that foster dialogue between groups of participants with different perspectives (e.g., academics, clinicians, patients, community members). These seminars will appeal to audiences both within and outside of academia and healthcare settings with the goal of increasing mutual awareness about health ethics and promote interdisciplinary and community reflections on various cross-cutting health ethics topics.

Our theme for the year 2018-2019 is moral awareness, which will be broached by a wide array of speakers. Questions related to this topic include (but are not limited to): What are the social and psychological mechanisms of moral awareness? How does one cultivate moral sensitivity? How can we respond to moral distress? What is our (personal, institutional, social) responsibility in the face of the awareness or unawareness of moral issues? Seminars/webinars are held on Thursdays over lunch time to facilitate individual and group participation.

Join us for our first seminar/webinar in October:

When: October 18th 2018, 12-1PM

Where: Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal (110 avenue des Pins Ouest, Auditorium Jacques Genest) OR livestreamed through our YouTube page: Pragmatic Health Ethics (

What : Dr. Kathryn Weaver, “Promoting a culture of ethical sensitivity for nursing and related health and human service disciplines”.

You will find attached the full program for the year 2018-2019 as well as a poster for Dr. Weaver’s presentation. All conferences are free and require no registration!

Visit our website or email us for more information and where seminars will be archived for future viewing or educational use (e.g., journal clubs, classroom, continued education):

Please do not hesitate to share this invitation widely! We are also open to feedback to create additional bridges between sectors, programs, and teams.

You will find attached:

· French and English versions of the annual program

· French and English versions of our first conference poster


The organizing team

Montreal Health Ethics Seminar Series


Nous sommes heureux de partager avec vous l’horaire annuel de la Série de séminaires de Montréal en éthique de la santé, en plus de vous inviter à vous joindre à nous pour la conférence d’ouverture de Kathryn Weaver le 18 octobre prochain, à 12h.

La Série de séminaires de Montréal en éthique de la santé est une série mensuelle qui vise à réunir plusieurs acteurs (citoyen-ne-s, clinicien-ne-s, universitaires et patients) autour de différents sujets en éthique de la santé. Notre objectif est de promouvoir l’éthique de la santé à travers un dialogue vivant entre ces acteurs. Nous voulons promouvoir une réflexion interdisciplinaire et alimenter de nouvelles pistes de réflexion qui pourront rejoindre un public large.

Le thème de notre série pour l’année 2018-2018 est la sensibilité morale (ou “moral awareness”). Certaines des questions qui nous intéressent incluent (sans toutefois s’y limiter): Quels sont les mécanismes sociaux et psychologiques de sensibilité morale? Comment pouvons-nous cultiver cette forme de sensibilité? Comment pouvons-nous répondre aux signes de détresse morale? Quelles sont nos responsabilités (personnelles, sociales, institutionnelles) face à la sensibilité ou l’insensibilité morale?

Joignez-vous à nous pour un premier séminaire en Octobre :

Où : Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal (110 avenue des Pins Ouest, Auditorium Jacques Genest) OU en direct sur notre page YouTube : Pragmatic Health Ethics


Quand : Le 18 octobre prochain, de 12h à 13h.

Quoi : Dr. Kathryn Weaver, “Promoting a culture of ethical sensitivity for nursing and related health and human service disciplines”.

Vous trouverez en pièce-jointe l’horaire des séminaires pour l’année 2018-2019 ainsi qu’une affiche pour la conférence du Dr. Weaver. Toutes les conférences sont gratuites et ne requièrent pas d’inscription!

Visitez notre site internet ou écrivez-vous pour plus d’informations :

N’hésitez pas à faire circuler cette invitation dans vos réseaux!

Vous trouverez en pièce-jointe :

· Une affiche en français et en anglais avec l’horaire annuel

· Une affiche en francais et en anglais pour la conférence de Kathryn Weaver

Au grand plaisir de vous y voir,

L’équipe organisatrice

Série de séminaires de Montréal en éthique de la santé

Corinne Lajoie, MPhil

Research Coordinator, Pragmatic Health Ethics Research Unit

Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal (IRCM)

110 avenue des Pins Ouest

Montréal, QC H2W 1R7