24e conférence Fillosophie : Passer la frontière de l’écriture littéraire à l’écriture philosophique: enjeux et possibilités

April 1, 2017 Leave a comment

La conférence aura lieu le vendredi 7 avril 2017 à 13h au DS-M465

Conférencière : Mélissa Thériault (Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières)

Résumé:

Les philosophes, comme les littéraires, entretiennent un rapport privilégié à l’écriture, action qui constitue l’élément le plus fondamental de leur activité professionnelle. Ces deux camps sont quasi-condamnés à un dialogue constant en raison d’un inévitable jeu d’emprunts et d’influences (par exemple : le recours à des expériences de pensée qui reposent sur des constructions fictionnelles dans la philosophie ainsi que le travail conceptuel à l’œuvre dans l’écriture romanesque). Mais il n’en demeure pas moins que les rivalités disciplinaires sont observables quant aux potentialités (et limites) inhérentes à chaque forme d’écriture. Mais si la frontière entre les deux n’était pas si nette? L’écriture littéraire peut alors être vue comme une démarche de recherche-création productrice de savoirs, ce qu’entend montrer cet exposé. Ainsi, nous verrons dans quelle mesure l’écriture littéraire, peut, lors qu’elle transgresse les frontières, contribuer non seulement à enrichir la philosophie mais lui être, en quelque sorte, nécessaire.

À propos de la conférencière:
Mélissa Thériault est professeure au Département de philosophie et des arts de l’UQTR depuis 2013 où elle dirige le Laboratoire de recherche en esthétique. Elle est vice-présidente de la Société de philosophie du Québec. Ses travaux actuels portent sur les liens entre littérature et philosophie, ainsi que sur les questions féministes. Son plus récent ouvrage est paru chez Nota Bene sous le titre « Le ‘vrai’ et le reste. Plaidoyer pour les arts populaires ».

Comme d’habitude, la conférence est gratuite et ouverte au public, et sera suivie d’une collation propice à l’interaction entre les participantes et participants.

23e conférence Fillosophie & Travaux En Cours : L’inférentialisme d’Aristote : une lecture dialogique du syllogisme

April 1, 2017 Leave a comment

En collaboration avec les conférences « Travaux en Cours » du département de philosophie de l’UQAM, la conférence aura lieu le mercredi 5 avril 2017 à 12h30 au W-5230 (l’espace philo, Pavillon W – Thérèse-Casgrain).

Conférencière : Zoé McConaughey (doctorante, UQAM et Université de Lille)

Résumé:

Il s’agira d’avancer quelques éléments soutenant une approche inférentialiste de la logique aristotélicienne, à savoir une approche mettant l’accent sur l’engagement du locuteur dans un jeu de questions et de réponses avec son interlocuteur, au cours duquel se dessine une structure inférentielle, structure qui définit la signification des termes du discours. Il sera alors possible d’aborder la syllogistique aristotélicienne de manière dynamique par ce jeu de questions-réponses, qui était par ailleurs au fondement des joutes dialectiques représentées par Platon dans ses dialogues socratiques et faisant l’objet principal des Topiques d’Aristote.

Comme d’habitude, la conférence est gratuite et ouverte au public, et sera suivie d’une collation propice à l’interaction entre les participantes et participants.

« Animal Citizens and the Democratic Challenge » (Sue Donaldson) & « Human Rights without Human Supremacism » (Will Kymlicka)

April 1, 2017 Leave a comment

Le GRÉEA recevra Sue Donaldson et Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University, A.P.P.L.E) pour deux discussions séparées sur leurs articles (non publiés) :

« Animal Citizens and the Democratic Challenge » (Sue Donaldson)

&

  « Human Rights without Human Supremacism » (Will Kymlicka)

Date : Lundi 3 avril 2017, de 14h à 17h
Lieu : Salle C-2059, Carrefour des arts et des sciences, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150, rue Jean-Brillant, Montréal (Québec)  H3T 1N8

Les discussions se dérouleront en anglais et dureront 1h30 environ chacune, incluant une courte pause entre les deux. Il est possible d’assister aux deux discussions ou à une discussion seulement dans la limite des places disponibles.

Réservation préalable et lecture des textes fortement conseillées.

Contact: greea@umontreal.ca

Résumés

« Animal Citizens and the Democratic Challenge » (Sue Donaldson)

“Nobody—from the most fervent animal liberationist to the most unrepentant carnivore” believes that animals are “fitted by nature to enjoy civil and political rights”. Thus spoke Brian Barry 16 years ago, and until very recently the idea that animal rights might include political rights, such as the right to vote, has been viewed as a reductio ad absurdum of animal rights theory. Even many theorists of the recent ‘political turn’ in animal rights theory, such as Alastair Cochrane or Rob Garner, who emphasize the need for animals’ interests to be considered in political decision-making processes, deny that this requires self-governance or self-representation and participation by animals themselves. In this paper I argue that if human-animal societies are to be truly democratic, animals must actively co-author the rules of society. But how can animals participate in politics if they can’t mark a ballot? I explore two strategies for overcoming the democratic deficit. The first incorporates mechanisms of political participation into the “spaces and places” that domesticated animals currently inhabit in society – namely domestic and work spheres. I refer to this as “enabling voice” within the existing geography of citizenship. While essential, I argue that this strategy is insufficient, and that surmounting these limits requires a fundamental reshaping of the landscape of citizenship. Genuine political participation requires that citizens have the freedom and opportunity to encounter one another in spontaneous, unpredictable encounters in spaces which they are empowered to re-shape together. I argue that this requires a drastic reduction in the confinement of domesticated animals, and a dramatic increase in the size of the public commons. A combination of enabling voice and transforming space is essential to a democratic zoopolis.

Human Rights without Human Supremacism (Will Kymlicka)

Several recent theories of human rights have appealed to the idea that human rights can be grounded on some account of human dignity. Critics of these `dignitarian’ accounts argue that the idea of human dignity is vague to the point of emptiness, and lacks any determinate content. In fact, however, recent discussions of human dignity all make one very specific claim: namely, that humans must not be treated in the same way we treat animals. Whatever else human dignity requires, it requires that we give humans a much higher status than we give animals. In this respect, dignitarian defenses of human rights follow in a long line of other supremacist accounts of human rights, all of which are as concerned to argue that animals do not deserve rights as they are to argue that humans do deserve rights. I will suggest that the human rights project will be much stronger, both philosophically and politically, if it jettisons such supremacist defenses. There is growing evidence that the more people draw a sharp species hierarchy between humans and animals, the more they draw hierarchies amongst humans, weakening the rights of subaltern groups. Defending human rights on the backs of animals is not only philosophically suspect, but politically self-defeating.

Frédérique de Vignemont – The sense of bodily ownership: an affective feeling

March 26, 2017 Leave a comment
Date: 21 avril 2017
Location: Room 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Time: 10h-12h

Event website: http://grin.normativity.ca/2016/07/ateliers-du-grin-2016-17/

Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean Nicod), The sense of bodily ownership: an affective feeling

Abstract: When I complain, “I feel pain in my shoulder”, there are two occurrences of the first person pronoun: at the level of the subject of the painful experience (I feel pain) and at the level of the body part in which I localize pain (in my shoulder). The first expresses the subjectivity of my sensation. The second expresses the awareness of my body as my own. Most philosophical interest has focused on the first, but what has been called the sense of bodily ownership – for want of a better name – has also recently come into the limelight both in the philosophical literature and in the psychological literature. Here I will defend a reductionist approach, according to which the sense of ownership can be reduced to some specific properties of bodily experiences. But which properties? I will argue that the feeling of bodily ownership should be conceived of on the model of the feeling of familiarity and that it consists in the sense of the spatial boundaries of one’s body as having a special significance for the self.

Susan Haack – Justice, Truth and Proof

March 24, 2017 Leave a comment

McGill University

Department of Philosophy

Colloquium Series

Faculty of Law

Legal Theory Workshop

Susan Haack

University of Miami

Justice, Truth and Proof

Friday March 31, 2017

1:00-2:30 pm

New Chancellor Day Hall 202

Jennifer Saul – Dogwhistles and Figleaves: Techniques of Racist Political Manipulation

March 24, 2017 Leave a comment

McGill University

Department of Philosophy

Colloquium Series

Jennifer Saul

University of Sheffield

Dogwhistles and Figleaves: Techniques of Racist Political Manipulation

Friday March 31, 2017

3:30 pm

Leacock 927

John Hacker-Wright – Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism as Critical Theory

March 20, 2017 Leave a comment

The Concordia Philosophy Department Speaker Series presents:

Speaker: John Hacker-Wright, U of Guelph.

Title:  “Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism as Critical Theory”

Date: Friday, March 31, 15:00-17:00

Location: Concordia Philosophy Department, 2145 Mackay, room S-201.

Abstract:  In this paper, I aim to support the thesis that neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism can be taken up as a critical theory, that is, as a theory that aims at emancipation and enlightenment by exposing hidden coercion. Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism, as presented in the works of Philippa Foot and Michael Thompson, is a view about the place of ethical value in human life. According to this view, reasoning and acting well are a crucial part of what makes human beings good, in the same sense that sharp teeth and an acute sense of smell make a tiger a good tiger. This theory employs a reflective, rather than a positivist theory of human nature; that is, it is an understanding of human life that is not derived from empirical science. Rather it is a transcendental self-understanding of human beings by themselves, a conception of ourselves that we must employ in order to act. As rational animals, we act against a background understanding of ourselves as possessing the power to act on reasons, and further we must have a determinate conception of what it is for that capacity to act on reasons to be well-developed. Current ideologies about human nature, from behaviorism to evolutionary psychology, encourage us to lose track of the priority of this form of self-understanding, and as a consequence, we often conceive moral value as something external to human action: these ideologies situate human life “outside ethics” in Alice Crary’s terminology. The disenchanted view of human life advanced by dominant scientistic ideologies encourage us to see our relation to value as instrumental. Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism is a critical theory, then, in that it seeks to restore this necessary and fundamental connection between human action and ethics to its proper central place in our views of human nature.