Shaun Nichols – Rational learners and moral rules
Le GRIN aura prochainement son cinquième atelier annuel, offert par Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona). L’événement est ouvert au public.
Titre de la conférence: Rational learners and moral rules
Date et heure: 8 janvier 2016, 10:00 – 12:00
Emplacement: UQÀM, 455 Blvd René-Lévesque E, local W-5215
Résumé/abstract: This paper considers Hilary Kornblith’s (1993, 2002) suggestion that epistemic norms have “a practical basis”. I argue that Kornblith’s view withstands many of the objections that have been made against it, and that it constitutes an improvement over certain other views that seek to ground epistemic normativity in considerations of value. But it doesn’t do everything: while they may be an essential part of the story, practical considerations alone don’t fully explain epistemic norms and their basis. In addition, Kornblith’s proposal requires, and seems to presume, ideas associated with accounts often thought to be competitors to the kind of view Kornblith endorses. However, while this may show that Kornblith’s view is incomplete, it doesn’t show that it’s incorrect. This, because Kornblith’s approach and the idea (for example) that belief as such is governed by certain norms needn’t be competing; in fact, they may be interestingly complementary.