Christine Tappolet – Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism Prospects
The Concordia Philosophy 2010/2011 Colloquium Series Presents:
Philosophy Department, University of Montreal
Values and Emotions: Neo-Sentimentalism Prospects
Friday December 3, 2010, 16:00-18:00PR-100, Philosophy Department, 2100 Mackay
Abstract: Neo-sentimentalism is the view that to judge that something has an evaluative property is to judge that some affective or emotional response is appropriate with respect to it. The difficulty in assessing neosentimentalism is that it allows for radically different versions. My aim is to spell out what I take to be its most plausible version. I distinguish between a normative version, which takes the concept of appropriateness to be normative, and a descriptive version, which claims that appropriateness in emotions is a matter of correspondence to evaluative facts. I argue that the latter version can satisfy the normativity requirement that follows from Moore’s Open Question Argument, that it is superior to the former with respect to the explanatory role of values, and with respect to the Wrong Kind of Reason Objection. Finally, I argue that the circularity that is involved is not vicious: understood epistemically, neo-sentimentalism remains instructive.
Sponsored by the Philosophy Department of Concordia University and SoPhiA through the Concordia Council on Student Life
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