Brian Redekopp – Frege and Husserl on Existence
Philosophy Department, McGill University
Graduate Workshop Series
Frege and Husserl on Existence
Tuesday, September 18th at 12h30
McGill University, Leacock Building, room 927
Abstract: Frege argues that existence is a property not of objects but rather of concepts, namely the property of having an instance. Frege’s view seems to be at odds with the experience of existence as the ‘standing out’ of things, an experience in which existence seems to be a peculiar feature of objects rather than a feature of the concepts they instantiate. In this workshop I consider this apparent problem with Frege’s theory of existence in light of Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition, which is a phenomenological account of how we perceive abstract objects such as states of affairs, universals, and, most importantly for my purposes, being. My (very tentative) conclusion is that the theory of categorial intuition supports Peter Geach’s view that Frege’s quantificational account captures only one sense of existence.